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 In the 2000 presidential election, African Americans made up only 
16% of the voting population in Florida but cast 54% of the ballots re-
jected in automatic machine counts (“machine-rejected ballots”).1 
Across the state, automatic machines rejected 14.4% of the ballots 
cast by African Americans, but only 1.6% of the ballots cast by oth-
ers.2 Racial disparities appeared even when the same voting technol-
                                                                                                                    
 * Cf. Langston Hughes, I, Too, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN 
LITERATURE 1258 (Henry Louis Gates Jr. & Nellie Y. McKay eds., 1997) (“I am the darker 
brother. They send me to eat in the kitchen when company comes. . . . Tomorrow, I’ll be at 
the table when company comes. Nobody’ll dare say to me, ‘Eat in the kitchen,’ then. . . . I, 
too, am America.”). 
 ** Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Several people read ear-
lier drafts of this Essay and provided helpful comments, including Richard Banks, Roger 
Fairfax, Floyd Feeney, Heather Gerken, Lani Guinier, Bill Hing, Kevin Johnson, Tom Joo, 
Pamela Karlan, Kenneth Mack, Cynthia Overton, Leslie Overton, Marc Spindelman, Mad-
havi Sunder, and Tobias Wolff. This Essay also benefited from the author’s conversations 
with Diane Amann, Holly Doremus, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Reggie Oh, Joseph 
Singer, and Terry Smith, as well as from the outstanding research assistance of Russell 
Johnson and Johanna Berta. Special thanks to Jim Rossi, Richard Hasen, Jason Kellogg, 
and Amanda Keener. 
 1. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 (2001) [herinafter U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS] (“Ap-
proximately 11 percent of Florida voters were African American; however, African Ameri-
cans cast about 54 percent of the 180,000 spoiled ballots in Florida during the November 
2000 election based on estimates derived from county-level data.”); Josh Barbanel & Ford 
Fessenden, Racial Pattern in Demographics of Error-Prone Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2000, at A25 (reporting that “black voters made up 16% of the vote on Election Day”). In 
compiling the data, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights relied on the percentage of regis-
tered voters in Florida who were African American (11%), U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra, at 2, whereas The New York Times relied on the percentage of those who voted on 
election day who were African American (16%), Barbanel & Fessenden, supra, at A25.  
 2. Katharine Q. Seelye, Divided Civil Rights Panel Approves Election Report, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2001, at A8 (reporting on a study conducted by Allan J. Lichtman, a history 
professor at American University and an elections expert); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 2 (showing that across Florida, ballots cast by African Americans were al-
most ten times more likely to be rejected than the ballots of whites); see also U.S. to Look 
Into Possible Irregularities at the Polls, CHIC. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2000, at 9 (reporting on a com-
puter analysis finding that “the more black and Democratic a precinct, the more likely a 
high number of presidential votes was not counted”). Studies have shown that racial dis-
parities in uncounted votes also exist outside of Florida. See, e.g., David Stout, Study Finds 
Ballot Problems are More Likely for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2001, at A9 (reporting on a 
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ogy was used. For example, counting machines rejected punch card 
ballots in predominantly African-American precincts in Miami-Dade 
County at twice the rate they rejected ballots in predominantly La-
tino precincts, and four times the rate they rejected ballots in pre-
dominantly white precincts.3 
 In their discussions of Bush v. Gore,4 legal academic commenta-
tors have not grappled with the significance of the racial disparities 
reflected in machine-rejected ballots. Despite the fact that the U.S. 
Supreme Court permanently halted the manual count of these bal-
lots,5 doctrinal analysis employing the facts as framed by the Justices 
has, by and large, commanded the most attention.  
                                                                                                                    
study conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform Committee 
that found “the votes of poor people and members of minorities were more than three times 
as likely to go uncounted in the 2000 presidential election.”). 
 3. Barbanel & Fessenden, supra note 1, at A25.  
The impact of these differences on the outcome will never be known but their 
potential magnitude is evident in Miami-Dade County, where predominantly 
black precincts saw their votes thrown out at twice the rate as Hispanic pre-
cincts and nearly four times the rate of white precincts. In all, [one] out of 
[eleven] ballots in predominantly black precincts were rejected, a total of 9,904. 
Id.; see also Kim Cobb, Black Leaders Want Action on Florida Vote Complaints, HOUS. 
CHRON., Nov. 30, 2000, at A24 (“U.S. Rep. Corrine Brown, D-Jacksonville, said that 16,000 
of the 27,000 ballots left uncounted in Duval County were from predominantly black pre-
cincts.”); U.S. to Look into Possible Irregularities at the Polls, supra note 2, at 9 (“In Miami-
Dade, the state’s most populous county, about 3 percent of ballots were excluded from the 
presidential tally. But in precincts with a black population of 70 percent or more, about 10 
percent were not counted.”). The disparity between African Americans and whites with re-
gard to machine-rejected ballots was higher than racial disparities in the use of punch card 
technology. Barbanel & Fessenden, supra note 1, at A25 (observing that “64[%] of the 
state’s black voters live in counties that used the punch cards while 56[%] of whites did 
so.”). But see Stephen Ansolabehere, Voting Machines, Race, and Equal Protection, 1 
ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that nationally, no significant correlation exists 
between race and punch card machine-rejected ballots). 
 4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 5. The discussion of race has been more extensive outside of the legal academy. See, 
e.g., Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 24, 2001) (alleging dispa-
rate voting procedures disadvantage racial minorities in violation of equal protection); U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1 (2001); Ansolabehere, supra note 3 (political scien-
tist’s study of race and voting technology); Barbanel & Fessenden, supra note 1, at A25. A 
few legal commentators have touched upon the relevance of race. See, e.g., Heather 
Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen’s and Richard Briffault’s 
Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 422-23 (2001) (“The Court’s failure to 
wrestle with these questions—what does equality mean, and how far should we go to at-
tain it when the twin problems of race and poverty permeate our democratic structures?—
gives an unwarranted patina of legitimacy to the election system.”); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Nothing Personal: The Evolution of The Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno To 
Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1366-67 (2001). 
There is credible evidence that systems that disproportionately reject votes 
both have a racially disparate impact and are more often used in the populous 
jurisdictions in which minority voters are concentrated. Thus, the newest equal 
protection once again vindicates the interests of middle-class, politically potent 
voters, while ignoring the interests of the clause’s original beneficiaries. 
Id.; Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Dead-
lock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14 (engaging in a statistical analy-
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 Without a consideration of race, however, the conversation about 
Bush v. Gore remains woefully incomplete. Politics and race in the 
United States have characteristics that sometimes overlap.6 Issues of 
racial identity and racial differences necessarily evoke questions of 
representation in the political process, particularly among groups 
that have been historically excluded. Because of the unique role of 
race in American politics, an examination of race yields important 
insights that might otherwise go unnoticed. 
 While this short Essay does not comprehensively analyze all of the 
components of race in Bush v. Gore, the piece does use race to ad-
dress normative assumptions about democracy embedded in the 
opinion.7 The use of a racial framework shows how these assump-
tions adversely impact racial minorities and other Americans as well. 
Professor Briffault acknowledges that the five U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices who voted to discontinue manual counting of the ballots in 
Bush v. Gore deviated from the Court’s trend of including previously 
excluded groups in the political process.8 In a similar spirit, Professor 
                                                                                                                    
sis and observing that “the larger the black population and the lower the literacy level, the 
higher the incidence of undervotes even after other factors are taken into account.”). 
 6. Cf. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY (forthcoming Feb. 
2002) (manuscript at 9, on file with author) (“[W]e begin by reclaiming the idea of race 
from its current, artificially limited conception as an exclusively individualistic form of 
personal identity. Rather than see race as merely denoting the biological facts of ancestry, 
we seek to deploy race as a proxy for political status.”); Vikram David Amar & Alan 
Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 976 (1998) (ana-
lyzing recent jurisprudence, and observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has dismissed the 
group dimension of political rights only, it appears, where race is involved”); Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy 
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 163, 191 (1994) (“The race of 
the voters matters in North Carolina precisely because the black voters have voted consis-
tently against the racial politics of North Carolina’s Congressional Club and Republican 
Party.”); Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
109, 130 (1994) (“In other words, minority group representation is not purely cultural, his-
torical, or biological; it also has a political component. Group members may identify collec-
tively along a common axis and organize to promote common interests in ways similar to 
other political associations.”); Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and 
Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647, 697 (1996) (asserting that “[i]dentity politics have been crucial 
and perhaps inevitable responses to perceived oppressions”). 
 7. Cf. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER xvi (2d ed. 2000) 
(asserting that a view from the “margin” allows one to understand both the center and the 
margin of society, and provides a sense of wholeness); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views 
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
928, 950-51 (2001) (“Critics of liberal theory, including critical race theorists, have offered 
another way to think about promoting equality and human dignity, one that reflects the 
perspective of the subordinated.”); Spencer Overton, Fannie Lou Hamer Wouldn’t Like 
This, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at B11 (discussing the Fannie Lou Hamer standard, 
which considers the campaign finance system from the perspective of a poor woman of 
color like Fannie Lou Hamer). 
 8. Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 325, 347-49, 372 (2001) (describing Bush v. Gore as quite different from the Court’s 
earlier inclusionary equal protection cases). Professor Gerken observes that the majority 
mistakenly believes itself to be agnostic, and she identifies many of the problems that re-
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Hasen asserts that Bush v. Gore’s break from past cases may “ease 
the way for future Supreme Court majorities to pursue their own vi-
sions of political equality without much thought about whether that 
vision is supported by existing case law.”9 This Essay agrees with 
Professors Briffault and Hasen to the extent that they suggest that 
Bush v. Gore rejected more inclusionary assumptions about democ-
racy articulated in earlier cases, but also asserts that the Court em-
braced merit-based assumptions that conditioned political recogni-
tion on an individual voter’s capacity to produce a machine-readable 
ballot.10 The use of race reveals how both the focus on individual re-
sponsibility and the expressive harm of exclusion that accompany the 
merit-based vision pose unique problems in the context of voting. 
 Though some might argue that taking race into consideration is 
inappropriate in a “colorblind” society,11 a consideration of race need 
not entail the employment of a “race card” that trumps all other con-
cerns and singularly insists on race-specific solutions. Instead, just 
as decisionmakers balance such concerns as individual rights, eco-
nomic efficiency, and general welfare,12 race can be used as one ana-
lytical tool to be considered in conjunction with other factors. Some 
might assert that race is irrelevant to an analysis of the machine-
rejected ballots, preferring instead to attribute responsibility to voter 
inexperience, voter illiteracy, and substandard voting equipment in 
particular jurisdictions.13 These explanations, however, are not pre-
political or randomly distributed throughout society but dispropor-
                                                                                                                    
sult from the Court’s failure to explicitly anchor its decision in a concrete, normative the-
ory of democracy. Gerken, supra note 5, at 415. This Essay attempts to identify some of the 
unstated assumptions underlying the perspective of the majority per curiam and its de-
fenders and begins to address some of the thornier normative issues embedded in the deci-
sion. 
 9. Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elec-
tions, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 380 (2001). 
 10. See infra Part I (discussing meaning of inclusionary and merit-based visions of 
democracy). 
 11. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)), for 
the proposition that “our Constitution is color-blind.” But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 336 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part) (noting that “no decision of this Court has ever adopted the 
proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind”). 
 12. See JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 279-82 (2d 
ed. 1997) (describing the use of various policy considerations as analytical tools in lawmak-
ing). 
 13. See, e.g., Ansolabehere, supra note 3 (arguing that nationally, no significant corre-
lation exists between race and punch card machine-rejected ballots and that racial dispari-
ties are explained by a higher percentage of less reliable punch card technology in African-
American precincts); Abigail Thernstrom & Russell G. Redenbaugh, The Florida Election 
Report: Dissenting Statement, at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/final_           
dissent.htm (asserting that the problems encountered during the Florida election were 
caused by bureaucratic inefficiencies, inexperienced voters, illiterate voters, substandard 
voting technology, and other issues unrelated to race). 
2001]                          A PLACE AT THE TABLE 473 
 
tionately impact certain populations due in part to past state-
sponsored racial discrimination.14 A consideration of race allows 
scholars and legal decisionmakers to avoid the pitfalls of the “color-
blind card,” an ideological extreme that mechanically trumps histori-
cal considerations, silences discussion, removes relevant issues from 
the table, and ignores important problems.  
 Part I of this Essay reviews two opposing visions of democracy 
that emerged in Bush v. Gore. The Florida Supreme Court’s more in-
clusionary vision prompted it to order that the ballots rejected by 
machines be counted manually, while the U.S. Supreme Court’s more 
merit-based vision motivated it to prohibit a manual count of the im-
perfectly marked ballots. Part II uses race to reveal many of the 
shortcomings of the merit-based vision of democracy. Although the 
Court’s facially neutral, merit-based criteria focus on individual re-
sponsibility, they interfere primarily not with individual rights, but 
with the ability of groups of voters like African Americans to identify 
with one another as a political community, to create alliances with 
others of different backgrounds, and to use the vote to enact political 
change. Further, the lens of race exposes how merit-based criteria 
convey an expressive harm of exclusion that carries particular po-
tency in light of a history of poll taxes, literacy tests, and other de-
vices used to suppress political participation by African Americans. 
While the merit-based vision’s adverse impact on African Americans 
should prompt concern in and of itself, Part III explores how the 
shortcomings of the merit-based vision adversely impact other 
Americans.15  
I.   COUNTING VOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEMOCRACY 
 Other commentators have recognized that one’s choices regarding 
the law of the political process are shaped by one’s assumptions 
about democracy, which reflect the individual’s understanding about 
particular cultural, professional, and social realities of politics.16 Two 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291 (1969) (invalidating 
county’s literacy test in part because the county’s previous maintenance of a de jure segre-
gated school system had “deprived its black residents of equal educational opportunities, 
which in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test”). 
 15. This Essay concentrates primarily on African Americans due to the high rate of 
machine-rejected ballots among African Americans. As developed in Part III, however, the 
experience of African Americans can be used as a lens to reveal structural problems with 
the merit-based assumptions of the Court that impact many others, including but not lim-
ited to Latinos, the elderly, and the poor.  
 16. See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 444 (1989) (observing that with regard to 
issues “soaked with political interest[,] . . . legal argument and judicial explanation     
. . . unselfconsciously reflect underlying assumptions about actual and potential social 
relations, and about the institutional arrangements and forms of political life fit for 
those relations as they are and are capable of becoming”); see also James A. Gardner, 
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different understandings of democracy animate the judicial opinions 
in Bush v. Gore—an inclusionary vision and a merit-based vision.  
 The inclusionary vision of democracy values widespread participa-
tion and looks to remove criteria or conditions that act as barriers to 
such participation.17 Under this vision, political participation is a 
right, and courts and democratic decisionmakers have a responsibil-
ity to create an environment that allows for, and even encourages, 
participation by all citizens.18 Professor Briffault, for example, lists 
the legislative apportionment cases and the invalidation of the poll 
tax to illustrate the inclusionary nature of the Court’s jurisprudence 
prior to Bush v. Gore.19 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, which bans 
literacy tests and fluency in English as prerequisites for voting,20 and 
                                                                                                                    
Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Recon-
struction of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 897 (1997) (“We can hardly expect 
to figure out what voting—or ‘fair’ voting, or ‘meaningful’ voting—means without some 
conception of what voting is for, what purpose it serves within a larger regime of democ-
ratic self-government.”); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Recounts: Form and the 
Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (observing that one’s as-
sumptions about democracy shape one’s preference for using rules or standards to allocate 
discretion); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001) 
(describing judicial culture as “the empirical assumptions, historical interpretations, and 
normative ideals of democracy that seem to inform and influence the current constitutional 
law of democracy”). 
 17. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the 
Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1991) (describing the “inclusionary understanding 
of democracy” in amended section 2 to the Voting Rights Act); cf. Gardner, supra note 16, 
at 904 (describing democratic theory in which “exclusion from the electoral process is ex-
clusion in the deepest possible sense from the essence of American society”). 
 18. See Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral or Political?, in LAW’S CENTURY (Aus-
tin Sarat ed., forthcoming 2001) (observing that, within a political conception of racial jus-
tice, American democracy is charged with three tasks: to maintain “equal and meaningful 
access for vulnerable racial publics” to institutions in which political identity is formed, to 
“modify the participatory practices through which” the political opinions of vulnerable ra-
cial publics “can be framed and communicated,” and to “insure that the interests of vulner-
able racial publics are represented in institutional arenas in which binding collective 
choices are discussed and made”). 
 19. Briffault, supra note 8, at 347 nn.103-04 (citing Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) 
(concluding that a Texas provision impermissibly disenfranchised otherwise qualified vot-
ers solely because they had not rendered their property for taxation); City of Phoenix v. Ko-
lodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating a provision excluding nonproperty owners 
from voting in an election to approve general-obligation bonds); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 
395 U.S. 701 (1969) (concluding that a Louisiana provision limiting the right to vote on the 
issuance of revenue bonds to taxpayers violated the Equal Protection Clause); Harper v. 
Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll taxes). But cf. Ball v. James, 
451 U.S. 355 (1981) (concluding that a state could rationally limit voting in a water district 
election to landowners and that each vote could be weighted respective to the amount of 
land each voter owned); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (rejecting the argu-
ment that Harper allows Congress to restrict political expenditures); Salyer Land Co. v. 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726-30 (1973) (concluding that a 
property-based scheme for electing the governing board of water reclamation district does 
not violate equal protection). 
 20. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1994) (suspending use of literacy 
tests nationwide); id. § 1973b(f)(1)-(2) (2001) (prohibiting English-only elections and other 
voting qualifications or prerequisites intended to deny language minorities the right to 
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the Twenty-fourth Amendment, which prohibits exclusion from fed-
eral elections “by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax,”21 
also embrace inclusionary notions of democracy. Proposals for public 
financing of politics fit into this category as well.22 
 The majority of the Florida Supreme Court embraced inclusionary 
assumptions about democracy in its conclusion that a “legal vote” 
constituted any ballot upon which the clear intent of the voter could 
be ascertained.23 While the Florida court’s articulation of the “clear 
intent standard” was based on state statutory language,24 the state 
                                                                                                                    
vote). But cf. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (up-
holding a literacy test that did not have a discriminatory effect because “[t]he ability to 
read and write . . . has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of 
the ballot”); Hasen, supra note 9, at 397 (“[Lassiter] is of questionable value following cases 
like Harper. . . . But if Lassiter remains good law, it stands for the proposition that the 
state can condition the franchise on voters’ ability to follow instructions—thereby insuring 
that only educated voters vote.”). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
 22. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitar-
ian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20-27 (1996). 
This Article argues for a new system of campaign finance. . . . Under this plan, 
each voter would have the opportunity to contribute vouchers to candidates or 
to interest groups in every federal election cycle. The interest groups would use 
the vouchers to contribute to candidates or to organize independent expendi-
ture campaigns. With limited exceptions, only funds from the voucher system 
could be spent to support or oppose candidates for elected federal offices. 
Id. at 6; Bruce Ackerman, Crediting Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 
AM. PROSPECT 71, 78-79 (1993); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1204, 1204 (1994) (“The Constitution of the United States should contain a principle, 
which I shall call ‘equal-dollars-per-voter,’ that would guarantee to each eligible voter 
equal financial resources for purposes of supporting or opposing any candidate or initiative 
on the ballot in any election held within the United States.”). 
 23. See Briffault, supra note 8, at 372 (arguing that although it was not constitution-
ally mandatory, the Florida court’s order was consistent with the inclusionary thrust of the 
United States Supreme Court’s prior application of the Equal Protection Clause in the vot-
ing rights area); Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 598-99 (2001) (asserting author’s 
belief that “as a matter of Florida law, the ‘clear intent of the voter’ standard meant that 
many of the ballots that were out of strict compliance with Florida law were nonetheless 
legal votes,” but noting that if such ballots did “not contain legally cast votes, then a re-
count process that includes them might infringe upon the voting rights of those citizens 
who did comply with the state’s requirements”). 
 24. In ordering a manual recount of ballots on which automatic machine recounts had 
failed to detect a vote for President and which had not yet been manually recounted, the 
Florida Supreme Court embraced phrasing established by the Florida Legislature. The 
statute provided that “[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a clear indica-
tion of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing board.” FLA. STAT. § 
101.5614(5) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 37, at 144, 145. According to the 
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provision, legitimate votes included not only 
ballots completely punched through, but also all ballots that expressed the clear intent of 
the voter. The Florida Supreme Court stated that the “clear message from” the legislature 
was “that every citizen’s vote be counted whenever possible,” thereby imputing an inclu-
sionary understanding of democracy to the Florida Legislature. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 
1243, 1254 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Thus, the court 
required canvassing boards and officials to count a vote if there was a “clear indication of 
the intent of the voter” on the ballot, unless it was “impossible to determine the elector’s 
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court noted that it had, in the past, “pointed to the ‘will of the voters’ 
as the primary guiding principle” in resolving election disputes.25 In 
prior cases it “repeatedly held . . . that so long as the voter’s intent 
may be discerned from the ballot, the vote constitutes a ‘legal vote’ 
that should be counted.”26 Rather than emphasizing the shortcomings 
of voters, the Florida court focused on the responsibility of the state 
and mentioned that the margins of error for punch card machines 
might be so significant as to require a reevaluation of the use of the 
machines.27 In short, a majority of the Florida Supreme Court inter-
preted the Florida statutory scheme as containing a broad, inclusive 
definition of a vote that put responsibility on state officials to manu-
ally review ballots that lacked machine-readable markings. United 
States Supreme Court Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Ste-
vens either agreed with or were prepared to defer to this interpreta-
tion and would have allowed a manual counting of the ballots.28 
 In contrast to the inclusionary vision of democracy, the merit-
based vision conditions the right to political participation on a citi-
zen’s ability to comply with a particular set of criteria.29 A merit-
                                                                                                                    
choice.” Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5)-(6) (2000)). The Florida Supreme Court may 
have focused on the legislative standard cognizant of earlier questions expressed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices as to whether the Florida Supreme Court based an earlier 
holding on state constitutional provisions rather than state legislative provisions or, 
through interpretation, “changed” the law in violation of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 145 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that “[i]n light of our previous remand, the Florida Supreme Court may have been 
reluctant to adopt a more specific standard than that provided for by the legislature for 
fear of exceeding its authority under Article II”). Note that inclusionary objectives were not 
absent in the consideration of the statutory structure containing section 101.5614(5), Flor-
ida Statutes. See, e.g., Letter from Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor, State of Florida, to Mem-
bers of the Florida Senate and House of Representatives (Mar. 15, 1977) (on file with the 
Florida State Archives) (observing shrinking voter participation nationally, and suggesting 
that electoral reform was needed that will “heighten public interest and participation” and 
“enhance[ ]  the ability of citizens to exercise their right to vote”). 
 25. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1254. 
 26. Id. at 1256; see also id. at 1261 n.20 (observing that “[t]his presidential election 
has demonstrated the vulnerability of what we believe to be a bedrock principle of democ-
racy: that every vote counts”). 
 27. Id. at 1261; see also id. at 1254 (asserting that the right to vote is not just the 
right to participate and to speak, “but more importantly the right to be heard ” ) (emphasis 
in original). 
 28. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Gins-
burg, JJ.) (“Thus, nothing prevents the majority, even if it properly found an equal protec-
tion violation, from ordering relief appropriate to remedy that violation without depriving 
Florida voters of their right to have their votes counted.”). Justice Souter stated that he 
would defer to the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of a legal vote, establish uniform 
counting standards, and allow the State to count the machine-rejected ballots. Id. at 131-
35. (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.). 
 29. Cf. Jacob Katz Cogan, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in Nine-
teenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473 (1997) (monitoring the nineteenth century shift 
in locating a person’s capacity for political participation externally in material things like 
property to internal characteristics such as literacy, and the continued disenfranchisement 
of women and African Americans); Michelman, supra note 16, at 480-85 (discussing en-
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based vision is individualist to the extent that an individual citizen 
rather than government has a responsibility to secure or meet the 
conditions necessary for his or her political participation.30 The 
merit-based vision of democracy also enhances societal well-being, 
the argument goes, because better political decisions arise from an 
electorate made up of citizens who are either competent enough or 
care enough to meet the criteria.31 Examples of devices that have 
been considered legitimate under merit-based assumptions about 
                                                                                                                    
franchisement on the basis of competence); James Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and 
[Mis]representation: Part II—Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision of the Right to Vote, 
43 HOW. L.J. 405, 452-55 (2000) (discussing the merit-based approach as applied to vot-
ing). 
 While the merit-based and inclusionary visions differ, they are not mutually exclusive, 
and both might be embraced in varying degrees. For example, while the Florida Supreme 
Court employed a more inclusionary vision than the U.S. Supreme Court, the state court’s 
order would have been even more inclusionary had it, in addition to ordering a manual re-
view of undervotes, ordered a manual review of overvotes. Also, many merit-based prac-
tices may not have been repudiated due to a rejection of merit, but because the practices 
arbitrarily excluded many who were believed just as competent or interested in making po-
litical judgments. In other words, the argument goes, the devices were not sufficiently pre-
cise in their task of allocating membership in political community based on merit. See 
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
893, 896 (1998) (“We have rejected [poll taxes, property qualifications, and literacy tests] 
not because we have come to believe their aim of ensuring the independent exercise of po-
litical judgment is not worth pursuing [but] . . . because we have come to think that some 
people had misappropriated these practices to unjustly exclude groups that were just as 
capable as the rest of us of exercising this kind of judgment. Their central democratic aim 
remains untarnished.”). 
 30. Cf. R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-
Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1036 (2001) (“Meritocracy is individualist 
insofar as it seeks to distribute opportunities and resources on the basis of the conduct or 
attributes of individuals. It is productivity-oriented to the extent that it distributes oppor-
tunities and resources based on predictions of future performance that will enhance socie-
tal well-being.”). 
 31. Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 171 (“The true reason of requiring 
any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so 
mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons had 
votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under some undue influence or other.”); 
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684-85 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting):  
[I]t is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax pro-
motes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about 
public affairs to pay $1.50. . . . [I]t was probably accepted as sound political 
theory . . . that people with some property have a deeper stake in community 
affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more knowl-
edgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the 
community and Nation would be better managed if the franchise were re-
stricted to such citizens. 
Id.; Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1959) (“Yet in our 
society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate 
campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise 
the franchise. It was said last century in Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed 
to insure an independent and intelligent exercise of the right of suffrage.”). 
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democracy include poll taxes, literacy tests, and a privately-funded 
campaign finance system.32  
 As acknowledged by Professors Briffault and Hasen, the five U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices who voted to discontinue manual counting of 
the ballots did not adopt the Florida Supreme Court’s inclusionary 
language.33 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, 
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas adopted a more merit-based interpre-
tation that put responsibility on the voter to produce a ballot that 
could be read by a properly functioning counting machine. The per 
curiam opinion repeatedly emphasized the failure of those who cast 
machine-rejected ballots in its reference to punch cards that “have 
not been perforated with sufficient precision” and were “not punched 
in a clean, complete way by the voter” due to either “error or deliber-
ate omission.”34 Upon its conclusion that the clear intent standard 
lacked uniformity in its application and violated equal protection, the 
Court did not order a manual count of ballots based on a uniform 
standard. Instead, the Court prohibited any further recognition of 
the imperfectly marked ballots by asserting that the Florida Legisla-
ture preferred to submit the state’s presidential electors by December 
12.35 A separate concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
                                                                                                                    
 32. Some have asserted that racial and gender exclusions were merit-based devices 
that excluded those who were not deemed sufficiently independent and competent to make 
political decisions. See Ortiz, supra note 29, at 908-09 (“Many believed that freed blacks 
were uniquely vulnerable to their former masters, employers, or opportunistic whites, and 
women were thought to be easily swayed by their husbands.”). 
 33. Briffault, supra note 8, at 372 (describing Bush v. Gore as quite different from the 
Court’s earlier inclusionary equal protection cases). 
 34. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000); cf. Oral Argument Tr. at 58, Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (indicating a question of Justice O’Connor as “Well, 
why isn’t the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I 
mean, it couldn’t be clearer. I mean, why don’t we go to that standard?”). 
 35. The Court stated that the Florida Legislature preferred to conclude the vote tabu-
lation process by December 12 in order to secure a federal statutory guarantee that Con-
gress would not challenge its election results. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109-11. But see Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 675 
(2001) (observing that the two Florida Supreme Court opinions cited by the Court do not 
“supply any authoritative pronouncement that December 12 is the absolute deadline for 
state law purposes”). The majority reasoned that Florida could not possibly tabulate the 
votes in accordance with minimal constitutional requirements by the deadline, and thus 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s manual recount order. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 
109-11. If imperfectly marked ballots contained votes as legitimate as perfectly marked 
ballots, then presumably equal protection guarantees would have required a manual re-
view, and such constitutional concerns would have trumped any federal statutory deadline. 
Cf. Briffault, supra note 8, at 359 (“If equal protection guarantees applied to imperfectly 
marked ballots, then presumably even ‘the press of time’ would not have justified the fail-
ure to review them.”); id. (“[T]here was nothing in the per curiam opinion that indicated 
that a voter who casts any particular sort of imperfectly marked ballot had any substantive 
entitlement to have that ballot treated as a valid vote.”). But see Hasen, supra note 9, at 
389: 
Nonetheless, the Court held that the Florida Legislature’s interest . . . in taking 
advantage of the “safe harbor” provisions of federal law for counting the state’s 
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Scalia and Thomas explicitly concluded that the Florida statutory 
scheme required counting only the ballots on which chads had been 
punched completely by voters.36  
 According to the merit-based assumptions of political participa-
tion underlying the majority’s opinion, voter intent was less impor-
tant than voter compliance. If a voter did not “properly” mark his or 
her ballot in a manner that machines could read, more pressing con-
cerns outweighed a manual review of the ballot. The Court extended 
a conceptual understanding of formal equality to invalidate the use 
of the clear intent standard. At the same time, the Court used the 
seemingly natural and logical cultural values of merit to limit the 
protection afforded by its particular brand of equality to machine-
readable ballots.37 Capacity to punch a ballot so as to completely re-
move a chad constituted a relevant criterion that the Court used to 
define the political community.  
II.   MERITOCRACY THROUGH THE LENS OF RACE 
 By employing a seemingly neutral, merit-based qualifier to iden-
tify those ballots that deserve recognition, the Court in fact avoids 
deeper and more difficult normative questions about structural ine-
qualities in our political process. This Part employs race to illumi-
nate some of the more troubling implications of the merit-based vi-
sion. 
A.   Race Exposes the Shortcomings of the Merit-Based Vision’s 
Individualized Focus 
 The lens of race reveals that the merit-based vision’s individual-
ized focus overlooks both the collective nature of political participa-
tion and the structural nature of racial disadvantage. 
                                                                                                                    
electoral votes trumped the rights of all Florida voters to have valid votes 
counted. It is not self-evident that such a state interest was compelling and 
trumped the right, recognized in Reynolds but ignored by the Court in Bush v. 
Gore, to have every vote count . . . .  
 36. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 120-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (concluding that 
“there is no basis for reading the Florida statutes as requiring the counting of improperly 
marked ballots” based on an opinion by Secretary of State Katherine Harris and an argu-
ment that the statutory provision was inapplicable because it allegedly applied only to 
damaged or defective ballots, not ballots imperfectly marked by voters). The concurrence 
reasoned that the clear intent of the voter was irrelevant and that the Florida Supreme 
Court’s flawed interpretation changed Florida election laws in violation of Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution. See id. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 37. The Court did not extend its conceptual understanding of equality to require that 
all voters have access to similar types of voting machinery. See id. at 109 (“The question 
before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may de-
velop different systems for implementing elections.”). 
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 In the absence of a racial analysis, the Court’s merit-based crite-
ria may appear neutral, reasonable, and benign. Because the Court 
gave all eligible Florida citizens the formal opportunity to vote on 
roughly the same terms, each Floridian had an equal opportunity to 
participate. The fact that some individuals were better able to follow 
instructions and perform the simple tasks necessary to produce a 
machine-countable ballot reflected differences in voter motivation, 
voter education, or voter experience.38 Individuals with greater edu-
cation and wealth are more likely to participate in politics gener-
ally,39 one might argue, and it is not surprising that these individuals 
were more likely to cast machine-readable votes. From this perspec-
tive, no outcast or disenfranchised groups existed that required pro-
tection. Instead, there were only responsible individuals whose po-
litical entitlement was threatened by the claims of those who failed 
to exhibit an appropriate amount of personal responsibility. 
 While the simple task of punching a ballot may not appear to be a 
significant barrier for any individual voter, the merit-based vision 
fails to recognize that politics involves not simply individual rights 
but also associational and structural concerns.40 Although individuals 
                                                                                                                    
 38. Cf. Dana Canedy, Florida Governor Calls Commission Report on Election Biased, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at A22.  
 Gov. Jeb Bush’s office sent a scathing letter to the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights today denouncing its preliminary findings on the problem-
plagued presidential race in Florida last November. The letter dismissed the 
investigation’s findings as irresponsible and biased. . . . Mr. Bush’s letter took 
aim at many of the findings, including the issue of widespread disenfranchise-
ment among minority voters. The letter said that, as with all voters, minorities 
could have been affected by a number of variables that the commission failed to 
take into account, such as “the voter’s education level, the voter’s experience 
with voting, the ballot design and the voting machine used.” 
Id. 
 39. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF 
NOVEMBER 1998, at 7 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/ 
p20-523.pdf (“In 1998, citizens who had bachelor’s degrees were nearly twice as likely (58 
percent) to report that they voted as those who had not completed high school (30 percent). 
At each level of educational attainment from high school completion and above, voting 
rates increase significantly.”); John Green, Paul Herrnson, Lynda Powell & Clyde Wilcox, 
Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy, Conservative and Reform-
Minded, Individual Donors and Campaign Finance 13 (1998), at http://www.               
opensecrets.org/pubs/donors/donors.htm (providing that, of contributors to the 1996 con-
gressional elections who responded to an academic survey funded by the Joyce Foundation, 
81% had annual incomes over $100,000 and 20% had annual incomes higher than 
$500,000). 
 40. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (describing voting rights as 
“individual and personal in nature”), with Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and 
Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1595 
(1993) (suggesting “that the one-person, one-vote doctrine is consistent with both group 
and individual conceptions of voting”), and Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Stand-
ing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2282 n.30 
(1998) (asserting that one-person, one-vote cases like Reynolds “should be viewed as cases 
about group political power . . . rather than purely about individual rights”). 
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cast votes, individual voters enact political change by associating 
with political groups.41 Under a constitutive understanding of voting, 
the experience of participation in politics is valued “as a process of 
formation or field of exertion of self or community” through which 
“persons or communities (or both, reciprocally) forge identities.”42 
Voting is seen as a “vehicle for self-development and identification, 
and a means for creating alliances and thus a community among in-
dividuals so engaged.”43  
 The Court’s seeming unwillingness to recognize these values in 
Bush v. Gore is especially evident when one considers race. In its fo-
cus on individual responsibility,44 either the Court fails to consider or 
is indifferent to the manner in which its merit-based criteria inter-
fere with the ability of voters like African Americans to identify with 
one another as a political community, create alliances with others of 
                                                                                                                    
 41. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The concept of ‘representation’ necessarily applies to groups: 
groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not.”); Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S, at 57, 59 (Nel-
son W. Polsby ed., 1971) (“We have, since Madison, realized that people tend to act politi-
cally not so much as individuals as in groups.”); Anthony A. Peacock, Voting Rights, Repre-
sentation, and the Problem of Equality, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION: 
SHAW V. RENO AND THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS 17 (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 1997) (“Al-
though representational politics is necessarily group oriented—groups of voters electing 
representatives, not individuals—the individual right to vote must be respected in any sys-
tem of representation.”); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted 
Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1742 (2001) (“[I]f we are going to recognize an aggregate 
harm like dilution, we must take into account its group-like qualities.”); Samuel Issa-
charoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 884 (1995) (“[T]he right to effec-
tive voting is incomprehensible without that conception of the group.”). 
 42. Michelman, supra note 16, at 451. 
 43. Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
491, 513 (2000). 
 44. The merit-based vision’s focus on individual responsibility is not inconsistent with 
the concentration by some Justices on the individual characteristics of voting. See Shaw v. 
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917 (1996) (“To accept that [a remedial] district may be placed any-
where implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast a 
ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not to its individual 
members. It does not.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (explaining that a 
state may not create voting districts on the basis of race because “[g]overnment must treat 
citizens as individuals”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-49 (1993) (describing harms that 
arise from districting based upon groups and not individuals); see also Amar & Brownstein, 
supra note 6, at 917 (criticizing “the Court’s exclusively individualistic perspective” in the 
voting and jury contexts); Gerken, supra note 41, at 1665-66 (describing the “highly indi-
vidualistic view of rights developed by the Rehnquist Court”); Guinier, supra note 40, at 
1601 (referring to “the efforts of some members of the Court to characterize representation 
as an exclusively individual notion”); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is 
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1996) (criticizing the Court’s application of its general 
equal protection doctrine, which focuses on individual rights, to the voting context); 
Tucker, supra note 29, at 410 (claiming that the majority in Shaw v. Reno “assumed that 
the right to vote was an individual, and not a group right”). 
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different backgrounds, and use the vote instrumentally to enact po-
litical change.45 
 By limiting the relevant political community to those who exhib-
ited the capacity to create a machine-readable ballot, the Court’s de-
cision diluted the political choices of both African Americans whose 
ballots were rejected by machines and African Americans who prop-
erly punched their ballots but identified politically with those whose 
ballots were rejected.46 African Americans who exhibited the capacity 
to punch ballots were no longer allowed to aggregate their prefer-
ences with those excluded by the Court’s ruling.47 While the Court 
justifies its decision on a lapse in individual responsibility, its deci-
sion penalizes all African Americans who identify as part of a politi-
cal group equally, with no distinction between those who did or did 
not completely punch their ballots. The Court did not individually 
reprimand those who failed to punch the ballot properly and who 
most probably do not even know of their transgression. Whereas a 
more inclusionary vision would have allowed African Americans to 
more freely forge a common identity and exert some degree of collec-
tive self-determination in improving their lives through shaping the 
political environment,48 the merit-based vision disabled a critical de-
vice used to engage in these activities. 
 The Court’s failure to recognize this dilution of political strength 
as illegitimate arises, in part, from a related problem of the merit-
based vision’s focus on individuals. The merit-based vision fails to 
adequately appreciate that racial disadvantage arises not simply 
from isolated, intentional actions of malicious individuals but also 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Cf. Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1532 (1987), rev’d on standing grounds, 
883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that election board’s failure to manually review 
punch card ballots rejected by tabulating equipment constituted a violation of the Voting 
Rights Act because such a failure results “in the City’s black voters having less opportunity 
than other members of the City’s electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice”). 
 46. Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-
Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 51 (1998) (“Blacks have historically functioned as a party 
within a party. Even during the era of limited black enfranchisement, blacks formed 
‘satellite’ or ‘parallel’ parties to advance their interests within the two-party structure.”). 
 47. Gerken, supra note 41, at 1669-70 (distinguishing vote dilution claims from claims 
based on conventional individual rights by observing that with regard to voting: “fairness 
is measured in group terms; an individual’s right rises and falls with the treatment of the 
group; and the right is unindividuated among members of the group”); Tucker, supra note 
29, at 414 (“When an electoral scheme systematically prevents the collective exercise of 
voting rights for particular groups, the individual right to vote is diminished accordingly.”). 
 48. Even after reviewing all of the imperfect votes, no undisputed winner of the 2000 
presidential election emerged. Dennis Cauchon & Jim Drinkard, Florida Voter Errors Cost 
Gore the Election: Bush Still Prevails in Recount of All Disputed Ballots, Using Two Most 
Common Standards, USA TODAY, May 11, 2001, at 1A (finding that had all disputed bal-
lots been counted by hand, George W. Bush would have won under two of the most widely 
used standards for counting votes, Al Gore would have won under the two least used, and 
that overall, most voters intended to vote for Gore). 
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from structural factors that fail to account for context and history.49 
The merit-based vision seems to assume that constitutionally suffi-
cient equity exists in the status quo—that the baseline has some de-
gree of fairness. Under these assumptions, differences in political 
outcomes that result from ballots not counted by machines do not re-
flect past discrimination but rather differences between autonomous 
individuals. Whereas the inclusionary vision actively seeks and re-
moves context-specific obstacles to political participation, the merit-
based vision fails to question whether its facially neutral criteria 
have a disparate impact upon certain populations. The merit-based 
vision either ignores or tolerates that factors such as lower educa-
tion, a greater percentage of first-time voters, a greater reluctance to 
ask for assistance, segregated residential patterns, and substandard 
voting equipment and assistance at the polls in predominantly 
African-American neighborhoods are not fully pre-political or merit-
based50 but stem in part from illegitimate factors such as past state-
sponsored racial discrimination.51  
                                                                                                                    
 49. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Juris-
prudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824-25 (1995) (“The substantive ap-
proach sees the disestablishment of ideologies and systems of racial subordination as in-
dispensable and prerequisite to individual human dignity and equality. The nonsubstan-
tive approach sees the individual right to be treated without reference to one’s race as pri-
mary.”); cf. Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT xiii, xxiv (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (“The debate that ensued in 
light of this different orientation engendered an important [Critical Race Theory] theme: 
the absolute centrality of history and context in any attempt to theorize the relationship 
between race and legal discourse.”). 
 50. Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1379 (1988) 
(“The rationalizations once used to legitimate Black subordination based on a belief in ra-
cial inferiority have now been reemployed to legitimate the domination of Blacks through 
reference to an assumed cultural inferiority.”); id. at 1370 (“Throughout American history, 
the subordination of Blacks was rationalized by a series of stereotypes and beliefs that 
made their conditions appear logical and natural.”). 
 51. Cf. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206 
(describing one factor used to determine a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as 
“the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision 
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, 
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process . . . .”); 
Lawrence, supra note 7, at 953 (“[The liberal theory] makes no effort to inquire into the 
ways that current facially neutral practices may have a foreseeable and unjustifiable dis-
criminatory impact or to account for unconscious bias in their administration.”); Spencer 
Overton, Voices from the Past: Race, Privilege, and Campaign Finance, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
1541 (2001) (observing that the existing distribution of property upon which the privately-
funded campaign finance system is based is not pre-political, but is shaped in part by past 
state discrimination). Judges and other decisionmakers’ assumptions about the democratic 
process are likely shaped, in part, by preferences and judgments about race. If one sub-
scribes to a colorblind ideology and believes that race is irrelevant outside of intentional 
actions by malicious individuals, merit-based assumptions about democracy that happen to 
exclude people of color may seem more logical. If one has a more expansive view that ap-
preciates the structural nature of race, one might adopt more inclusionary assumptions 
about the nature of democracy. 
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 In short, the merit-based vision isolates broader structural con-
cerns, both about historical disadvantage and contemporary racial 
identities, because its individualized focus is not sufficiently expan-
sive to take the broader problems into account.52 The narrowness of 
the merit-based vision, however, should not suggest that it is a neu-
tral or impartial tool completely removed from political outcomes.53  
B.   Race Exposes Particular Expressive Components 
of Merit-Based Vision 
 In addition to exposing the merit-based vision’s failure to appreci-
ate the unique characteristics of voting that extend beyond the indi-
vidual, a consideration of race allows one to more broadly compre-
hend the expressive effect of the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore. 
 Voting’s expressive component “rests on the message the electoral 
system is understood to disseminate, and accordingly represents 
something bestowed on the political community.”54 To members of the 
majority of the Court, the Florida Supreme Court’s manual recount 
order sent a message of haphazardness and arbitrariness that was 
“not well calculated to sustain the confidence that all citizens must 
                                                                                                                    
 52. Cf. Tucker, supra note 29, at 453 (“The individual portrait . . . is very ill-suited for 
the political landscape in which voting occurs. . . . [P]oliticians are keenly aware of the ra-
cial, social, political, and economic characteristics of voters, and redraw district boundaries 
to comport with those groups they believe will best enhance the political strength of them-
selves or their party.”). 
 53. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 32 
(1987) (“The unstated point of comparison is not neutral, but particular, and not inevitable, 
but only seemingly so when left unstated.”); see also e.g., Banks, supra note 30, at 1034 
(“Merit is a functional concept—no quality or characteristic is inherently meritorious. 
Merit is necessarily defined with respect to particular contexts, goals, and values.”); Jamin 
B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521, 551 (1995) (“Merit is 
neither self-defining nor self-revealing; it is an ever-changing concept that is historically, 
socially, and institutionally contingent—and often contested. It is impossible to define 
merit without asking what kinds of institutions we want to have and for what purposes.”); 
Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
1449, 1503 (1997) (“Reason and merit are culturally and ideologically specific constructs 
that depend on a particular ideological discourse and can adjudicate only for those who 
subscribe to that ideology.”). 
 54. Katz, supra note 43, at 513 n.119; see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520 (2000) 
(“On the rights and equality side of constitutional law, [expressive] theories assert that 
state action is required to express the appropriate attitudes toward persons.”). Some might 
suggest that the consideration of race in analyzing the Court’s decision to exclude the im-
perfectly marked ballots is dangerous because such an analysis might send the message 
that individuals are less competent in political participation simply because of race. Cf. 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (“Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of 
lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our 
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.”). But see Lawrence, 
supra note 49, at 838 (“The colorblind race baiter completes his white supremacist wiz-
ardry by blaming affirmative action itself for creating hostility, resentment, and racial di-
visiveness.”). 
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have in the outcome of elections.”55 The message sent by such a re-
count would cast “a cloud” over the “legitimacy” of the election and 
might threaten democratic stability.56 The Court, however, did not 
explore the message sent by its merit-based qualifier that resulted in 
imperfectly marked ballots being disregarded. 
 The expressive harm that the Court’s exclusion of the ballots gen-
erated is especially potent when one examines the problem through 
the lens of race. Recognizing that a “voter is a full member of the po-
litical community,”57 the dismissal of the imperfectly marked ballots 
sends a message of exclusion from the political community.58 Exclu-
sion from the political process conveys a form of second-class citizen-
ship on those who are excluded.59 Historically, election administra-
                                                                                                                    
 55. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“The contest provision, as it was man-
dated by the State Supreme Court, is not well calculated to sustain the confidence that all 
citizens must have in the outcome of elections.”). 
 56. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring with the 
Court’s order to stay the manual count of ballots). 
The counting of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view threaten 
irreparable harm to petitioner, and to the country, by casting a cloud upon 
what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election. Count first, and rule upon 
legality afterwards, is not a recipe for producing election results that have the 
public acceptance democratic stability requires. 
Id. 
 57. Karlan, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that voting “announces that the voter is a full 
member of the political community”); see also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: 
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 93 (1989) (“Voting . . . is an assertion of be-
longing to a political community.”); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, at 15-16 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 
1994) (noting that the right to vote “confer[s] full citizenship on the members of the 
group”); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 26 (1991); 
Gardner, supra note 16, at 906 (“To seek the vote is to seek formal recognition as a full 
member of society; to be denied the vote is to be either excluded altogether from member-
ship in the community or consigned to some kind of second-class citizenship.”); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilu-
tion Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 179-82 (1989) [hereinafter Karlan, Maps 
and Misreadings] (discussing the symbolic value of civic inclusion). 
 58. Cf. Katz, supra note 43, at 512-13 (“Denial of the vote is tantamount to exclusion 
from the community or relegation to second-class citizenship, with the message of exclu-
sion being the primary harm produced.”). 
 59. See Lani Guinier, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Where Do We Go From 
Here?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 
283, 284-85 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1993). The Voting Rights Act:  
is premised on a broad vision of political equality and empowerment. The vision 
of empowerment anticipated an electorate actively participating in policy re-
form, not merely reconfigured districts that ensure legislative voting privileges 
for a few black elected officials. The vision imagined a transformative politics 
that would value political participation for its own sake in order to recognize 
the autonomy and dignity of black voters. Participation would affirm their 
status as first-class citizens in a democracy. 
Id.; KARST, supra note 57, at 94 (“Voting is the preeminent symbol of participation in the 
society as a respected member, and equality in the voting process is a crucial affirmation of 
the equal worth of citizens.”); SHKLAR, supra note 57, at 2-3 (contrasting slavery to voting, 
and arguing that “the ballot has always been a certificate of full membership in society,” 
an indicator of “social standing” that has the “capacity to confer a minimum of social dig-
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tors used merit-based qualifications, such as literacy tests, under-
standing and character clauses, property ownership, and poll taxes, 
to unfairly secure political power through the exclusion of African 
Americans and others.60 The dramatic drop in voter registration and 
participation among African Americans in the thirty years following 
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on racial discrimi-
nation in voting illustrates the effectiveness of these tools.61 The per-
centage of voting-age African Americans who participated in Florida 
gubernatorial elections plummeted from 87% in 1884 to just 5% in 
1896.62 Just as facially race-neutral poll taxes and literacy tests dis-
seminated the message that African Americans were to be dispropor-
tionately excluded from the political process, the Court’s prohibition 
on a review of the imperfectly marked ballots, the majority of which 
came from the African-American community, conveyed a message of 
racial exclusion.63  
                                                                                                                    
nity” on those who have it, and describing the vote as “a demand for inclusion in the polity, 
an effort to break down excluding barriers to recognition”); Ronald Dworkin, What is 
Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (voting is a means by 
which a “community confirms an individual person’s membership, as a free and equal citi-
zen . . . .”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710 (1993) (“The primary value underlying the participation cases . . . 
is an aspect of . . . civil inclusion: ‘a sense of connectedness to the community and of equal 
political dignity; greater readiness to acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence 
broader consent and legitimacy’”) (quoting Karlan, Maps and Misreadings, supra note 57, 
at 180); see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); David M. Est-
lund, Who’s Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in 
Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1437 (1993); Miriam Galston, Taking 
Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Delib-
erative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 331 (1994). 
 60. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543 (1965) (“The Virginia poll tax was 
born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro.”); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND 
AMERICAN LAW § 4.4.1-.2, at 191-93 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing white primaries); SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 78 (1998); see also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: 
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 
(1974); Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 
523, 524 (1973); Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering 
the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389, 397 (1985) (observing that “[i]n the South, 
state and local governments began to use gerrymandering, poll taxes, literacy tests, ‘grand-
father clauses,’ white primaries, malapportionment, residency requirements, property 
ownership requirements, fraud, and violence to bring about the total disenfranchisement of 
Black voters”).  
 61. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 68. 
 62. KOUSSER, supra note 60, at 91-103 (discussing the racially exclusionary impact of 
Florida poll taxes and eight-box provisions designed to disenfranchise illiterate African 
Americans, and the decline in African-American voter turnout); see also Katz, supra note 
43, at 512-13 n.117 (discussing the expressive harm generated by post-Reconstruction dis-
enfranchisement and citing LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE 
AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 531-556 (1979), and GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND 
JIM CROW 123-24 (1996)). 
 63. The Court was complicit in the messages of disenfranchisement sent to African 
Americans in the 1800s and early 1900s. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (denying 
jurisdiction of a federal court over claim brought by African-American resident of Alabama 
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 The Court’s use of merit-based criteria also has special meaning 
in light of recent controversies regarding affirmative action. As in the 
affirmative action context, some might interpret the Court’s reliance 
on merit with regard to the law of democracy simply as a pretext to 
exclude African Americans, or at least as a misplaced set of priorities 
in which seemingly neutral criteria are valued over the presence and 
participation of Americans from all backgrounds in public institu-
tions.64 Indeed, merit has been used as an argument to invalidate 
race-conscious measures that secure the political rights of histori-
cally disadvantaged voters.65  
 Some might claim that the merit-based vision sends the message 
that “voters must follow the rules of voting.” Such a message, how-
ever, loses its appeal when one recognizes that Florida officials in-
cluded many votes that did not comply with a literal and generally 
undisputed interpretation of the law, including but not limited to im-
properly submitted absentee votes.66 Recognizing this inconsistency, 
one message of the Court interpreted through the lens of race is that 
“members of politically disfavored groups must follow the rules of 
voting.” Another possible message, the substance of which is consis-
tent with merit-based criteria, conveys that “those with the foresight, 
                                                                                                                    
to compel local board of registrars to enroll his name upon the voting lists of the county); 
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (concluding that literacy tests do not facially 
discriminate on the basis of race and do not violate equal protection); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1875) (invalidating legislation providing for punishment of a 
Kentucky election inspector who refused to receive and count the votes of African Ameri-
cans). But see Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (concluding that Oklahoma 
grandfather clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 64. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
 65. Cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (striking down a state law that al-
lowed only native Hawaiians to vote for trustees of public agency that managed programs 
designed to benefit native Hawaiians and asserting that “[o]ne of the principal reasons 
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a 
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities”); 
Katherine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair Representation for Mi-
norities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 621 n.72 
(1995) (arguing that “[o]nce we recognize that racial groups are entitled to be represented 
as racial groups, we are well on our way to enthroning group fairness, rather than individ-
ual merit, as the basis for all societal decisions”). But cf. Tucker, supra note 29, at 454-55 
(describing the “merit-based approach” of critics of affirmative action as inappropriate in 
the voting rights context). 
 66. Cf. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000) (holding 
that a county supervisor’s decision to allow representatives of one political party to add in-
formation to absentee ballot request forms in violation of Florida law did not invalidate re-
quests); David Barstow & Don Van Natta Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Over-
seas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 1 (reporting that “[u]nder intense pres-
sure from the Republicans, Florida officials accepted hundreds of overseas absentee ballots 
that failed to comply with state laws”). While some might assert that the neutrality of a 
merit-based vision of democracy is necessary when resolving a disputed election (as op-
posed to prospectively setting forth the processes for running an election), the selective ap-
plication of merit-based criteria establishes the transparency of such neutrality. 
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determination, resources, and skill to manipulate rules will be re-
warded.” 
 The lens of race also exposes the democratic instability that arises 
from the expressive harm of exclusion. Whereas an inclusionary vi-
sion conveys government’s respect for all of its citizens and lends le-
gitimacy to government decisions, the same cannot be said about the 
merit-based vision. A political victory based on merit-based assump-
tions sends an exclusionary message that undermines the confidence 
necessary to ensure the voluntary consent of citizens. In such an at-
mosphere, it is even more difficult to build coalitions, accommodate 
diverse viewpoints in political discourse and government policy, and 
engage in constructive dialogue across racial lines.67 Reconciliation 
and healing are almost impossible because African Americans have 
not been fully included in decisionmaking.68 
 Instability in the wake of exclusion arises not only from the per-
ceived illegitimacy of political results, but also from the perceived il-
legitimacy of the institutions that led to those results.69 African 
Americans overwhelmingly vote against conservative politicians, and 
five Justices appointed by Republican presidents prohibited the 
counting of thousands of ballots, the majority of which were from Af-
rican-American precincts.70 The perception that the Court attempted 
to secure its political objectives by ignoring the political choices of Af-
rican Americans is potentially destabilizing.71 It taps into a reservoir 
                                                                                                                    
 67. Cf. Guinier, supra note 6, at 131 (“Exclusion of a racial or language minority 
group exposes a deep fissure in the American democratic bargain, which purportedly rec-
onciles majoritarian preferences with minority interests.”). 
 68. Cf. Guinier, supra note 59, at 285 (“A transformative politics would also ensure 
government legitimacy because it would give disadvantaged groups a substantive basis for 
lending their consent to government decisions.”). 
 69. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And, above 
all, in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split decision runs the risk of un-
dermining the public’s confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a public          
treasure. . . . [W]e do risk a self-inflicted wound—a wound that may harm not just the 
Court, but the Nation.”). 
 70. Others might raise suspicions about the Florida Supreme Court’s political motives 
in including the undervotes. In the context of history which has excluded African Ameri-
cans from political, educational, and economic spheres, however, the high federal court’s 
message of exclusion may convey a message to some that extends past mere political pos-
turing. 
 71. Others, including but not limited to the Justices themselves, have addressed 
whether political motivations influenced the Court. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 
128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although we may never know with complete certainty the 
identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is per-
fectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule 
of law.”), and William Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787 (2001) (accepting that the Court’s decision was political, and in-
quiring as to whether it was appropriate), and Ginsburg Recalls Florida Recount Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at A25 (reporting that Justice Ginsburg stated that “[w]hatever 
final judgment awaits Bush v. Gore in the annals of history, I am certain that the good 
work and good faith of the U.S. federal judiciary as a whole will continue to sustain public 
2001]                          A PLACE AT THE TABLE 489 
 
of suspicion among African Americans that they do not count as citi-
zens within the political community.72 The indifference of others who 
either rationalize or idly tolerate such exclusion only compounds the 
anger, resentment, and frustration felt by those who are excluded.73 
In effect, the merit-based vision’s message of exclusion can promote 
racial distrust and detachment, factionalism, and political instability 
generally.74 
III.   MERIT AND THE EXCLUSION OF US ALL 
 The problems associated with the merit-based vision are espe-
cially visible through the lens of race due to the unique interaction of 
history, political identity, and race in the United States. While racial 
                                                                                                                    
confidence at a level never beyond repair”), with Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111 (“None are 
more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the members of this Court, 
and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the 
President to the people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere.”), and Bill 
Rankin, The Ruling: Was it Politics? That, Too, is in Dispute, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 
14, 2000, at 2B (reporting that in response to questions about political motives of the Court 
following Bush v. Gore, Justice Thomas stated that one should not “apply the rules of the 
political world” to the Court, that the Justices “have no axes to grind” but simply protect 
the Constitution, and that he had never heard any discussion “of partisan politics among 
members of the court”). 
 72. Cf. Lawrence D. Bobo, Michael C. Dawson, & Devon Johnson, Enduring Two-
Ness, PUB. PERSP., May/June 2001, at 12 (reporting the results of the National African 
American Election Survey that show blacks are politically alienated even when compared 
to white Democrats). 
 73. Cf. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 111 (1992) (“Isn’t this the point of Invisible Man . . . where Ralph Ellison depicts 
blacks as a category of human beings whose suffering is so thoroughly ignored that they, 
and it, might as well not exist?”) (citing RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 261-80 (1972)); 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 56 (1991) (observing that in-
visibility results from “not being part of the larger cultural picture”); Martin Luther King, 
Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 843 (1993) (“We 
will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the 
bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people.”). 
 74. As recently as 1997, the Court recognized that “[s]tates . . . have a strong interest 
in the stability of their political systems,” and political stability has most often been in-
voked to justify ballot access laws that favor the two major parties to the disadvantage of 
other parties. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997) (“States 
also have a strong interest in the stability of their political systems.”); Rutan v. Republican 
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The stabilizing effects of such 
a [two-party] system are obvious.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party 
system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective gov-
ernment. The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and 
federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party 
system, which permits both stability and measured change. 
Id.; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (“Splintered parties and unrestrained fac-
tionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. It appears obvious to us 
that the [provision at issue] furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political sys-
tem. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling . . . .”) (citations 
omitted). 
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disadvantage in and of itself warrants concern, it is also important to 
note that the vulnerability of African Americans to the Court’s rem-
edy serves as a diagnostic tool that exposes structural faults in a 
merit-based vision of democracy that impact others.75 
 Many Americans of various backgrounds, including but not lim-
ited to the elderly, the poor, the language and religious minorities, 
and the disabled, use voting as a means to maintain communities of 
identity and to exert collective self-determination in shaping their 
world through the political process.76 Exclusionary, merit-based as-
sumptions about democracy that ignore context and history interfere 
with the ability of these Americans to identify with one another and 
ally themselves with others in the political sphere.77 Further, a di-
verse group of Americans suffer the expressive harms associated 
with an exclusionary, merit-based vision of democracy, whether the 
message is “you are too old and senile to vote,” or “English is our 
primary language,” or “you are poor and don’t deserve the same 
equipment as other voters.” 
 By confronting merit-based assumptions about democracy embed-
ded in the majority’s reasoning in Bush v. Gore, one discovers that 
there is more to fix in American democracy than vote-counting ma-
chinery. Indeed, a focus on better machines and more uniformity may 
push other, more weighty questions about the meaning of democracy 
to the background. Significant disparities in participation and even 
the counting of votes are likely to continue under a system of formal 
equality that fails to account for context-specific barriers to political 
inclusion.78 Some commentators may make seemingly persuasive ar-
                                                                                                                    
 75. Cf. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 6 (manuscript at 1): 
Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner’s canary. It is easy 
enough to think that when we sacrifice this canary the only harm is to commu-
nities of color. Yet if those who are racially marginalized do function as the 
miner’s canary, others ignore problems that converge around racial minorities 
at their own peril. We are ignoring the symptoms that tell us we are all being 
poisoned. 
Id. 
 76. Cf. KOUSSER, supra note 60, at 49 (noting that poll taxes and literacy tests disen-
franchised poor whites in addition to African Americans). 
 77. See Dana Canedy, Vote Spices Up Bubbling Ethnic Stew, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
2000, at A13 (describing similarities between Jews and African Americans in Florida, and 
reporting that many “elderly Jewish voters in Palm Beach County said confusing ballots 
had caused them to mistakenly vote for Patrick J. Buchanan . . . who is perceived by some 
as anti-Semitic” and that many Jews “believe they lost out on a chance to elect the first 
Jewish vice president”). 
 78. For example, a state might provide matching funds to every county for the pur-
chase of optical scanner voting systems. This proposal, however, might fail to result in 
meaningful inclusion and might even increase racial disparities, as poorer counties might 
not be able to afford the systems. Similarly, every county might have optical scanners, but 
the majority of spoiled ballots might still come from precincts of color. Rather than re-
sponding with indifference to these situations, reasoning that every voter had an equal op-
portunity, decisionmakers should seek strategies that maximize inclusion. Cf. Jordan, 
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guments that educational and economic markets should reward com-
pliance with uniform merit-based criteria with no regard for context 
or history.79 With regard to democratic exchange and governance, 
however, the need for commitment from a diverse, broad base of per-
spectives suggests that we should not limit political community with 
narrow, merit-based assumptions.80 
 In challenging the merit-based vision, perhaps the most difficult 
questions ask how far courts and legislatures should go to promote 
inclusion. Should decisionmakers consider every context-specific is-
sue that impacts any individual in interpreting and restructuring 
election laws? At what point does this analysis become too unman-
ageable and impracticable?  
 These questions reflect inevitable tensions between administra-
tive convenience on the one hand and important substantive values 
related to inclusiveness and participation on the other. This Article 
does not purport to identify the proper place to draw a bright line be-
tween the two, as further discussion is necessary to determine how to 
balance the competing values. It is clear, however, that mechanical 
rules that prioritize administrative convenience over a meaningful 
view of participation value the time of administrators over citizens’ 
interests in democratic inclusion. Administrative convenience alone 
cannot be the primary basis of a democracy that purports to reflect 
the will of the people.81 
CONCLUSION 
 Examining race allows us to see more clearly the shortcomings of 
merit-based assumptions of democracy harbored by the majority in 
                                                                                                                    
supra note 60, at 397 (noting that majority rule and formal equality through the 
Fourteenth Amendment “have created havens for racial and political gerrymandering, 
while at the same time providing inadequate protection for the rights of representation of 
Blacks and other discrete and insular minorities”).  
 79. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 171-80, 393-461 (1997) (criticizing affirmative action 
programs); see also SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF 
RACE IN AMERICA (1990). 
 80. Cf. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 242 (1987) (admitting that 
“[a] white denied a seat on a city council cannot claim entitlement on the ground of ‘merit.’ 
. . . Qualification for office is not measured by meritocratic standards in the customary 
sense”); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 44, at 1202 (arguing that “the Court’s attempt to 
integrate voting rights law into its more general approach to affirmative action is both mis-
guided and incoherent . . . because government decisionmaking with respect to voting, at 
least in its functional sense of rationing and apportioning the power to govern, is different 
from other governmental decisionmaking”); Tucker, supra note 29, at 454-55 (criticizing 
the merit-based approach as applied to voting, distinguishing redistricting from em-
ployment, contracting, and college admissions decisions). 
 81. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351 (1972) (“States may not casually deprive 
a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the 
State.” (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965))). 
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Bush v. Gore, and to understand why this limited vision of democracy 
inadequately protects the political rights of racial minorities and 
other Americans as well. By conditioning political participation on 
the capacity to create a machine-readable ballot, the merit-based vi-
sion interferes with the ability of groups of voters to identify with one 
another in order to form a political community, create alliances with 
others of different backgrounds, and use the vote to enact political 
change. The merit-based vision also conveys an expressive harm of 
exclusion that may lead to democratic instability. Improved dialogue 
and a more comprehensive understanding of democratic visions and 
election procedures generally, as well as Bush v. Gore specifically, 
require the integration of race as an important analytical tool. 
